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NOTES

Tobacco Proves Addictive: The
European Community's Stalled Proposal
to Ban Tobacco Advertising
ABSTRACT

This Note examines the recent initiative to ban tobacco advertising
within the European Community. The Note first addresses the European
Commission's proposed directive, exploring the Commission's statedjustifications as well as the opposing member states' procedural and legal
objections. This Note then analyzes the European Community debate by
comparing it to the United States movement to ban tobacco advertising.
The author concludes that, like its United States counterpart,the European proposal is ill-fated, and thatfailure to reach a consensus on controversialproposals such as the tobacco advertising ban seriously undermines completion of a true internal market envisioned in the Treaty of
Rome.
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INTRODUCTION

On May 15, 1991, the European Commission (Commission) 1 adopted
a modified proposal (Proposal)2 aimed at harmonizing tobacco advertis-4
ing3 in the twelve member states of the European Community (EC).
The Proposal calls for a ban on all direct and indirect5 advertising of
tobacco' within the EC.7 Although the Proposal is consistent with the
1. See 1 GREGG MYLES, EEC BRIEF, 1-137 to 1-165 (rev. 1992) [hereinafter EEC
BRIEF] for a succinct 'overview of the Commission's role within the European Community (EC). See also P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
52-66 (5th ed. 1990).
2. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Advertising for Tobacco Products,
1991 O.J. (C 167) 3 [hereinafter Proposal].
3. For the purposes of the Proposal, the Commission defines advertising as:
[alny form of communication, printed, written, oral, by radio and television broadcast and cinema, with the aim of direct or indirect effects of promoting a tobacco
product, including advertising which, while not specifically mentioning the product, tries to circumvent the advertising ban by using brand names, trade marks,
emblems or other distinctive features of tobacco products.
Id. art. 1, at 4.
4. The current member states of the European Community are Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, and the United Kingdom. See Europe and America Preparefor 1992, BROADCASTING, Apr. 17, 1989, at 35 [hereinafter Europe and America].
5. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
6. For purposes of the Proposal, the Commission defines tobacco products as "all
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Single European Act's8 comprehensive plan to bring about European
unity,9 the EC's consideration of the Proposal has heightened tensions
within the European Community and has triggered the "most ferocious
lobbying campaign in the [European] Parliament's history."' This tension has arisen primarily because the member states disagree on the validity of a tobacco advertising ban and because the ban attempts to regulate through legislation matters which industry and government have
traditionally resolved through negotiation."" Moreover, the Commission's
decision to require a simple majority vote for passing the Proposal in the
EC Council of Ministers rather than the more rigorous unanimity standard has led to further disagreement. 2
At stake in this controversy is the long-anticipated" realization of a
European internal market."' Member states have adopted approximately

products intended to be smoked, sniffed, sucked or chewed, inasmuch as they are, even
partly, made of tobacco." Proposal, supra note 2, art. 1, at 4.
7. Proposal to Ban All Tobacco Advertising, EUR. REP., May 18, 1991, at 11.
8. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169), 1 [hereinafter SEA].

9. Why the Commission Proposes a Directive Limiting the Advertising of Tobacco
Products, RAPID (EC PRESS RELEASE), Nov. 11, 1991 [hereinafter Why the Comission
Proposes].
10. Boris Johnson, Tobacco Lobby Wins EC Reprieve, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Jan. 17, 1992, at 9.

11.
SFILE,

Geoff Meade, Euro MPs Set to Back Tobacco Adverts Ban, PRESS ASS'N
Feb. 11, 1992.

NEW-

12. The Commission based this decision on article 100A of the Single European Act
which allows the Commission to require only a qualified majority approval if a proposal
is deemed necessary for establishment or furtherance of the single market. SEA, supra
note 8; see discussion infra part III.A.
13. The Common Market, first promised in the Treaty of Rome over 30 years ago,
has yet to materialize. As a consequence, the term "Common Market" has become a
term used with increasing embarrassment and decreasing accuracy in describing the trading and market relationships among the EC states. This failure prompted Lord
Cockfield, with the endorsement of the EC Summit, to prepare a renewed campaign for
a single European market. The campaign is explained in detail in Cockfield's "White
Paper." See Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the
European Council, COM(85)310 final at 7 [hereinafter Completing the International
Market]; see also J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403,
2453. "The bulk of the [White Paper] is little more than a legislative time table for
achieving in 7 years what the Community should have accomplished in the preceding
30." Id.; see also infra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
14. Although the Treaty of Rome does not define the term "internal market," additions to the Single European Act indicate that internal market means: "[a]n area without
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is
ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty." Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [EEC TREATY] art. 8.

152

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 26.149

90%15 of the 282 measures outlined in the European Community's
blueprint for a "Europe without frontiers,""6 entitled the White Paper."
Despite these significant advances, the statistical estimates of the success
of the harmonization program are misleading.' The often proferred
measures of success are misleading because many of the measures already adopted are among the least controversial.19 Recent proposals,
however, including the tobacco advertising ban, involve traditionally protected industries and, therefore, invariably elicit assertions of sovereignty
by the member states. These attempts to retain control over certain industries threaten the progression toward complete integration.2 °
The motivations of the dissenting member states vary, but few dissenters have hands unstained by nicotine.2 1 Greece's opposition, for example,

stems from protectionist concerns about its domestic tobacco industry.22
The United Kingdom's opposition reflects the British desire to protect
advertising and the commercial news media which spend more than

fifty-five million pounds each year on tobacco advertising.2" Implicit in
each state's dissent, however, is the belief that the evils of tobacco adverBroadly speaking, the European CommuIiity has set out to eliminate three types of
barriers to trade: (1) Physical-meaning border stoppages and delays from customs formalities; (2) Technical-regarding varying product standards, technical regulations, and
nationally protected procurement markets; and (3) Fiscal-involving varying rates of
value-added taxes (VATs) and excise duties. See LARAINE L. LAUDATI, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE DELEGATION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: KEY

ISSUES IN THE 1992 UNIFORM PROGRAM 7-13 (1990).

96,566
15. [New Developments Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
(Oar. 16, 1992).
16. See Europe's Internal Market, ECONOMIST, July 9, 1988, at 8.
17. Completing the Internal Market, supra note 13, at 7.
18. The "harmonisation programme" is outlined in the Single European Act. See
SEA, supra note 11. The term "Harmonize", a favorite word of the integrationists, conveys the conclusion that when complete agreement among the 12 nations is impossible,

approximate agreement is acceptable.
19. See Mark Miller, Single Market to Reshape Continent,

CRAIN'S CHI. BUS.,

Sept. 25, 1989 at T1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.

20. See Brian Love, EC Commission Makes Sacrifices for Edinburgh Summit,
Europe's Internal Market, ECONOMIST, July 9,

REUTERS LIBR. REP., Dec. 9, 1992;

1988.
21. Saved by Greek Smoke, THE TIMES (London), Nov. 12, 1991. Margaret
Thatcher, who as the United Kingdom's Prime Minister was one of the most vocal opponents of the ban, recently agreed to be a geopolitical consultant to the United Statesbased tobacco giant Philip Morris. That's Life, CALGARY HERALD, Jan. 2, 1993, at D9.

22. Saved by Greek Smoke, supra note 21, at 3.
23. Boris Johnson, Europe Votes to Ban All Advertising of Tobacco, DAILY
GRAPH

(London), Feb. 12, 1992, at 10.

TELE-
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tising are not so egregious as to necessitate Community-wide
legislation.24
This Note examines the dispute between the EC members concerning
the possible implementation of the tobacco advertising ban. The Note
first addresses the terms of the Proposal, as well as its purposes and justifications. It then discusses the opposing member states' legal challenges
to the ban. Next, it analyzes the EC debate against the backdrop of a
similar United States movement in 1986 and 1987.25 Finally, this Note
concludes that although the Proposal is timely and would effectuate advancement toward a true European internal market, its passage, like its
United States counterpart, is ill-fated.
II.

THE PROPOSAL: HISTORY AND IMPLEMENTATION

A.

History of the Proposal

In July 1986, the European Council (Council) 26 and representatives
from the EC member states launched a program entitled Europe Against
Cancer.2 7 Designed to reduce the incidence of cancer,2 the program concentrated on measures to reduce tobacco use within the European Community.2 9 Within the context of the Europe Against Cancer program, the
Council adopted a plethora of directives," including a ban on smoking in
public areas 3 strict regulations with respect to the labelling of tobacco
products, 2 and a limit on the tar content in cigarettes.3 3 In October
1989, the Council banned television advertising for cigarettes and other
tobacco products.3 4
In 1989, the Commission introduced a new proposal to regulate tobacco advertising. 5 This proposal sought to harmonize authorized adver24. See id.
25. See infra part IV.
26. See 1 EEC BRIEF, supra note 1, at 1-308 to 1-311 (providing a succinct overview of the European Council); see also MATHIJSEN, supra note 1, at 34-52.

27. 3 EEC BRIEF, supra note 1, at 3-266 to 3-267.
28. Id.
29.

Id.

30. See id.
31. Council Regulation, 89/C 189/01, 1989 O.J. (C 189) 1. Public areas include:
establishments where services or goods are provided to the public, hospitals, schools, cinemas, sports arenas, airports, and transportation systems. Id. at 2.

32.
33.

Council Directive 89/622, 1989 O.J. (L 359) 1.
Council Directive 90/239, 1990 O.J. (L 137) 36.

34.
35.

Council Directive 89/552, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 523.
Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Advertising of Tobacco
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tising and established a ban on indirect forms of advertising in children's
publications. 36 The European Parliament (Parliament), 37 however, rejected the proposal as too limited" and advocated an alternative proposal
that would ban all tobacco advertising. 39
Responding to a December 1990 announcement by EC Social Affairs
Commissioner Vasso Papandreou4" that a ban on tobacco advertising
was vital to the success of the European Community's larger campaign
against cancer, the Commissioners agreed in May 1991 to accept a modified proposal4 a that would ban tobacco advertising everywhere except inside tobacco sales outlets.4 2 Brought before the Parliament for debate in
January 1992, adoption of the proposal was delayed until the Parliament could evaluate its legal basis.4 3
Following the consideration of nearly 30 amendments to the Proposal44 and a declaration by the Parliament's Legal Affairs Committee affirming the Proposal's legal foundation,4 5 the Parliament approved the
Proposal in February 1992 by a vote of 150 to 123.46 The Parliament
scheduled the Proposal for debate by the EC Health Ministers in May

Products in the Press and by Means of Bills and Posters, 1989 O.J. (C 124) 5.
36. Commission Proposes a DrasticLimit on the Advertising of Tobacco Products,
RAPID (EC Press Release), May 15, 1991, at 29 [hereinafter Commission Proposes a
Drastic Limit].
37. See 1 EEC BRIEF, supra note 1, at 1-234 to 1-283 (discussing the role of the
Parliament in the EC); see also MATHIJSEN, supra note 1, at 16-34.
38. Because this proposal was limited to indirect advertising in the press and by
means of bills and posters which could influence children, the Parliament found the proposal to be too limited in scope. Commission Proposes Limit on Tobacco Advertising,
[New Developments Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 95,913, at 52,214
[hereinafter Commission Proposes Limit].
39. See id.
40. Ironically, Vasso Papandreou, the original supporter of the Proposal, is a chainsmoker. Shelia Kaplan, Up in Smoke, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 16, 1991, at 5.
41. Of the seventeen Commissioners, only a handful opposed this proposal. See Proposal to Ban All Tobacco Advertising, supra note 7, at 11.
42. For the purposes of the Proposal, the Commission defined tobacco sales outlets as
"establishments specializing in the sale of tobacco and with enclosed indoor premises for
serving customers. Shops with several counters for a range of different goods on sale are
excluded from this definition." Proposal, supra note 2, art. 1, at 4.
43. See infra part III.A.
44. See Andrew Hill & Philip Rawstorne, MEPs Likely to Back Plan to Ban Tobacco Advertising, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1992, at 2. The amendments range from changing the Proposal's legal basis to overturning the draft directive altogether. Id.
45. Id.
46. See EC ParliamentBacks Tobacco Advert Ban, REuTERs LIBR. REP., Feb. 11,
1992. There were 12 abstentions. Id.
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1992."' The United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece
voiced serious objections which created a deadlock within the EC48 and
delayed a decision on the Proposal. The Proposal was discussed at the
following EC Health Ministers meeting in November 1992 but was
again tabled when no breakthrough could be reached.49 Reacting to the
impasse, Social Affairs Commissioner Vasso Papandreou warned that
the success of the single market was at stake and noted that under current EC rules member states with domestic tobacco advertising bans may
prohibit the free flow of any publication that carries tobacco
advertising.50
The Proposal cannot become an enforceable directive until a majority
of the EC Health Ministers agree to its terms. 51 Even if a majority of
the Health Ministers approve the Proposal, it would be subject to review
by the Parliament.5 2
B.

The Proposal of the Directive in Detail

The main provisions of the Proposal include:
(a) A ban on advertising for tobacco products in such media as newspapers, billboards, or cinemas;
(b) A provision limiting tobacco advertising to tobacco sales outlets
only;
(c) A ban on free distribution of tobacco products;

(d) A ban on indirect tobacco promotion by, for example, using a tobacco trademark, logo, or other characteristic sign used to advertise a
product other than tobacco; and
(e) A ban on the launching of a new tobacco product or brand by
47. Jane Thynne, Setback for EC Smoking Adverts Ban,

DAILY TELEGRAPH

(London), Nov. 28, 1991, at 4. Each of the 12 member states has a representative Health
Minister. Id.
48. In January of 1992, due to public pressures at home, Denmark changed its position from opposing the ban to supporting it. Melinda Wittstock, MEPs Vote to Ban
Tobacco Adverts, THE TIMES (London), Feb. 12, 1992, at A19. Greece also seems to be
moving toward favoring the ban. Johnson, supra note 23, at 10.
49. Coopers & Lybrand, Consumer Policy, EC COMMENTARIES, Jan. 28, 1993.
50. The Week in Europe, PRESS ASs'N NEWSFILE, Nov. 19, 1992. Vasso Papandreou
explained that the Treaty of Rome allows the protection of public health to take precedence over the free movement of goods. Sarah Lambert, Ministers in Fog Over Tobacco

Advertising, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 14, 1992, at 9.
51. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
52. See REIN RIJKENS & GORDON E. MIRACLE, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF ADVERTISING 67-80 (1986), for a discussion of the draft directive process from initiation to
implementation. The author details the various phases through which a directive must
pass: (1) preparatory, (2) consultative, (3) decisionmaking, and (4) implementation.
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using the reputation of an established trademark acquired with a product other than tobacco."
The terms of the Proposal translate into a total ban on direct advertising, with the sole exception being point of sale advertising. 54 According
to sources within the European Community, the point of sale exception
will not include retail stores such as supermarkets and shopping centers
because of the perceived inability of such outlets to afford adequate consumer protection. 55 Moreover, the Proposal would prohibit establishments operating within the point of sale exception from displaying any
tobacco advertisements that would be visible from the street. 56
The Proposal also would ban all forms of indirect advertising, that is,
advertising that does not specifically offer the product but uses its reputation. 57 In practice, a tobacco company would be able to sponsor cultural or sporting events and inform the public that it was doing so, but it
would not be able to use a tobacco logo or sign associated with tobacco
products in connection with its sponsorship.58 Finally, the Proposal
would provide the EC with effective means to enforce the ban by providing the EC with the power to bring legal action against violating mem59
ber states.
C.

The Commission's Purpose in Adopting the Proposal

The Commission's motive in adopting the tobacco advertising ban is
clear from the face of the Proposal. The proposed directive purports to
expand and strengthen the EC-wide campaign to combat cancer.6" During a press conference following the Commission decision, Social Affairs
Commissioner Vasso Papandreou maintained that the ban was justified

53.

Proposal, supra note 2.

54. Health: Proposal on Tobacco Advertising Ban on Agenda for Next European
Commission Meeting, Eur. Rep., May 9, 1991, at 14. The ban would include any radio,
poster, or film advertisements of tobacco products. Id.
55. Id. Likewise, automatic cigarette vending machines would not qualify under the
point of sale exception. Proprietary to the United Press International 1992, Feb. 11,
1992.

56. Id.
57.

Commission Proposes Limit, supra note 38.

58. Id. The Commission agreed to amend the Proposal so that a company that sells
tobacco products as a secondary activity could continue to sponsor public events. The
Cartier company, for example, would be covered by this amendment. E.C. Minority
Holds Up Ban on Tobacco Advertising, AGENCY FRANCE -PRESSE, May 14, 1992.

59.

See Commission Proposes a Drastic Limit, supra note 36, at 31.

60.

Proposal, supra note 2.
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on public health grounds."1 She supplemented the Proposal's language
that tobacco use "constitutes a very important death factor each year"62
with the powerful statistic that almost 440,000 people in the EC die
annually as a result of tobacco use.6"
Another motivating factor for the Commission was the desire to protect the public health of young people. 4 As the Commission stated, "No
tobacco prevention policy can be consistent as long as tobacco advertising
remains accessible to non-smokers and children." 6 In the European
Community, forty-four percent of all adolescents have experimented with
or habitually use tobacco products.66 Children as young as six-years old
have displayed the ability to identify cigarette advertisements.6 7 Further,
studies have shown that ninety percent of all smokers begin using tobacco before the age of twenty.68 Because of these statistics, Commission
health authorities are convinced that advertising contributes to the initiation and continued use of tobacco by adolescents.6 9
D.

The Commission'sJustificationfor the Proposal

The Commission defends its adoption of the Proposal on five grounds.
First, the Commission argues that a tobacco advertising ban is an effective way of reducing smoking, especially among children.7 0 Second, the
Commission maintains that the terms of the Proposal are narrowly tailored to achieve its purposes. 7 ' Third, the Commission contends that voluntary codes have not proven to be an effective alternative to an advertising ban. 72 Fourth, the Commission maintains that public opinion
strongly supports the ban.73 Lastly, the Commission insists that the Proposal is necessary to achieve completion of true internal market.74
61. See EC Commission Proposes Total Ban on Cigarette Ads in Member States,
Daily Rep. Executives (BNA) No. 95, at A-3 (May 16, 1991) [hereinafter Total Ban].
62. See Proposal, supra note 2, at 3.
63. Total Ban, supra note 61. The Commission maintains that one person dies every
minute in the EC from a smoking-related illness. EC ParliamentBacks Tobacco Advert
Ban, supra note 46, at 7.
64. See Proposal, supra note 2, at 3.

65.

Why the Commission Proposes, supra note 9.

66. Id.
67. Id.

68. Commission Proposes a Drastic Limit, supra note 36, at 29.
69. Why the Commission Proposes, supra note 9.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See
See
See
See
See

infra part
infra part
infra part
infra part
infra part

II.D.1.
II.D.2.
II.D.3.
II.D.4.
II.D.5.
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1. Nexus Between Cigarette Advertising and Smoking Initiation and
Maintenance
There are generally four functions of tobacco advertising. 5 Tobacco
advertising may be effective in: (1) influencing smokers to change
brands, (2) influencing smokers to smoke more, (3) influencing nonsmokers, including children, to begin smoking, and (4) deterring smokers
from quitting.76 The Commission's Proposal is founded on the belief that
tobacco advertising fulfills all of these functions and, moreover, creates a
climate of social acceptability for smoking. 7 The Commission supports
its conclusions with evidence that illustrates where tobacco advertising
bans have been instituted consumption of tobacco has decreased.7
The Commission further justifies the ban as a means of preventing
adolescents from ever beginning the smoking habit.79 Relying on evidence that individuals who are still nonsmokers by the age of twenty are
unlikely to begin smoking,8 0 the Commission concludes that teenagers
and younger children must constitute a "market segment of highest priority"'" for the tobacco industry. As the Commission has asserted, "The
failure of this generation to start smoking would devastate the [tobacco]
industry within years." 82 Thus, the Commission justifies the Proposal as

a necessary method of stopping the tobacco industry's advertising campaign against vulnerable adolescents.8"

75. SIMON CHAPMAN, GREAT EXPECTORATIONS: ADVERTISING AND THE ToBACCO INDUSTRY 23-24 (1986).
76. Id.
77. See Why the Commission Proposes, supra note 9.
78. For example, the Commission cites to New Zealand where tobacco consumption
fell to 25.1% among the adult population 6 months after the ban compared to 26.7%
immediately prior to the ban. See id.
79. Id.
80. See CHAPMAN, supra note 75, at 30.
81. Id..
82. Why the Commission Proposes, supra note 9. A recent study at the University of
Massachusetts Medical School confirmed the importance of juvenile smoking. The study
found that since 1988, when R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company began its advertising
campaign featuring a cartoon camel, the proportion of smokers under the age of 18 who
smoked Camels rose from less than 1% to 32.8%. The percentage of adult smokers choosing Camels, however, is only 4%. Michael Conlon, CigaretteMakers Trying to Target
Children, Researchers Say, REUTERS Bus. REP., Dec. 10, 1991, at 9.
83. The Commission deems adolescents and children to be "the most vulnerable
members of our society." Commission Proposes a DrasticLimit, supra note 36, at 30.
A document acquired by the United States Federal Trade Commission illustrates the
tobacco industry's strategy in reaching children:
[A]n attempt to reach young smokers, starters, should be based.., on the follow-

1993]
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Narrowly Tailored

The Commission justifies the Proposal as being narrowly tailored on
the grounds that it would suppress the illicit effects of tobacco advertising while retaining its legitimate functions.8 4 Specifically, the Commission maintains that the ban would limit tobacco advertising to smGkers.8 5
By prohibiting tobacco advertising generally, while still allowing it
within the tobacconists' shops the advertising would not entice nonsmokers into smoking and any useful information about new brands
would still be provided to tobacco consumers."6
The Commission also points to the fact that tobacco advertising repre-

sents only 1.6 percent of the European Community's total advertising
budget.8 7 Consequently the Commission believes that the advertising ban
will not have serious adverse economic repercussions in the EC."s
3.

Voluntary Codes Are Not Effective

In approving the blanket ban on tobacco advertising, the Commission
concluded that voluntary codes within the member states are not an effective means of regulating the tobacco industry. 9 Specifically, the Commission criticized voluntary codes as failing to cover all aspects of tobacco
promotion, being "lengthy and secretive," difficult to monitor, and having no real penalties for violations." As the Commission stated, "The
term 'voluntary' means that the measures are agreed to by the indus-

ing major parameters:
-Present the cigarette as one of a few initiations into the adult world.
-Present the cigarette as part of the illicit pleasure category of products and
activities.
-In your ads create a situation taken from the day-to-day life of the young
smoker but in an elegant manner have this situation touch on the basic symbols of
the growing-up, maturity process.
-[R]elate the cigarette to 'pot', wine, beer, sex, etc.
-DON'T communicate health or health-related points.
CHAPMAN, supra note 75, at 31-32.
Furthermore, the Commission noted that in Norway a tobacco advertising ban reportedly decreased the percentage of 13-15 year olds who were smoking at least 1 cigarette a

day, from 17% in 1975 to 10% in 1990. Why the Commission Proposes, supra note 9.
84.

See supra notes 75-77 "nd accompanying text.

85.

Why the Commission Proposes, supra note 9.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Geoff Meade, Decision Delayed on Tobacco Ads Ban, PREss ASS'N NEWSFILE,
Nov. 11, 1991.

90. Why the Commission Proposes, supra note 9.
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try-clearly no industry will voluntarily agree to measures that genuinely threaten its trading viability." 91
4.

Public Support

The Commission believes that past acknowledgment and present support for tobacco advertising limitations is a further justification for the
Proposal. 2 For example, in October 1991 a television advertising ban
for all tobacco products was applied to all EC states.9 3 Moreover, in
December 1991 an EC survey showed that three out of four people in

the European Community support a tobacco advertising ban.9 '
5. A Single Market Measure
Under article 100A of the Single European Act, the Commission may
impose regulations which are necessary to further the EC's progression
toward complete integration. 5 Because Italy, France, and Portugal have
placed a total ban on tobacco advertising, and all of the EC states limit
tobacco advertising to some degree, the Commission is fearful that states
with more stringent regulations on tobacco advertising will inhibit the
free circulation of publications from other member states that do not
have a ban or have less restrictive guidelines for tobacco advertising."
The Commission views the Proposal as a way of harmonizing existing
EC law in a manner that will avoid the barriers to trade inherent in a
segmented market.9

91. Id.
92. See id.
93. See Barry James, Can a Tobacco Ad Ban Help EC Smokers Quit?, INT'L HEmALD TRIB., Feb. 26, 1992.
94. Sytske Looijen, European Topics: Joint Profit for U.S. and Scotland Yard,
INT'L HERALD TRIB.,

Dec. 5, 1991. "Of the 13,000 people interviewed in the 12 EC

countries, 74 percent supported the idea of the ban, 15 percent opposed it and 11 percent
gave no opinion." Id. Further, an absolute majority of smokers in all of the member

states supported a ban (64% support, 27% against). Community-Wide Supportfor Closer
Union at Maastricht, ORIGIN UNIVERSAL NEWS SERVICES LIMrrED, Dec. 3, 1991.
Only in the Netherlands are smokers evenly divided on the issue (47% support, 45%
against). Id.

95. See SEA, supra note 8.
96. See Total Ban, supra note 61, at A-3.
97. Why the Commission Proposes,supra note 9. See also Community-Wide Support
for Closer Union at Maastricht,UNIVERSAL NEWS SERVICES LIMITED, Dec. 3, 1991.
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III.

MEMBER STATES' CHALLENGES TO THE PROPOSAL

In a speech at the Forum Europe Conference on Advertising in Brussels, Sir Leon Brittan detailed three types of Commission proposals. 98 In
the first type of proposal, the Commission sets a basic framework for
action but does not impose rigid terms.9 9 Such proposals are not regulatory per se, but aim to eliminate existing restrictions within the member
states."' Brittan cites the Directive on Comparative Advertising' 0 ' as illustrative. In the Directive on Comparative Advertising the Commission
granted all EC states the right to use comparative advertising thereby
overriding four or five member states that had previously banned such
advertising within their states.' 2 Generally regarded as a practical
means to achieve the Single Market, this first type of proposal is relatively uncontroversial.' 3
The second type of proposal, however, has been subject to increased
criticism because it requires a decision as to whether the European Community should get involved with matters that arguably are better left to
the individual member states.' 4 Although some states question whether
the Commission has the power to enforce such legislation, member states
have usually acquiesced because of the underlying policies of the legislation.' 08 Most member states find the proposals to be a pragmatic way to
proceed.'0 6
The third group of proposals, according to Brittan's scheme, are "the
most contentious."10 7 These proposals involve areas where there exists

no obvious consensus within the EC.'0 8 The problem with these proposals is that they regulate affairs through Community legislation rather
than through the traditional means of negotiation between industry and

98. Sir Leon Brittan, Advertising in Europe: Freedom to Choose-Freedom to
Trade, Address Before the Forum Europe Conference (June 20, 1991), in RAPID (EC
Press Release), June 20, 1991.
99.

Id.

100. Id.
101.

Id.

102. Id.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. An example of such lack of consensus is the recent EC effort to establish a
single European currency and common central bank. See Neville Nankivell, European
Community: It Was 'One's Bum Year', FIN. PosT, Dec. 26, 1992, at 28.
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government. 09 Finally, such proposals breed contention because the
Commission requires only a qualified majority to approve them, thereby
silencing any minority opposition. Brittan maintains that the Proposal
falls within this third category. 1 0
The dissenting member states oppose the tobacco advertising ban for
seven specific reasons. First, they raise the technical argument that because the Proposal is not vital to achieving the internal market, it may
not be passed by a mere majority under article 100A, but rather requires
unanimity under article 235.1" Second, the opponents claim that any
connection between cigarette advertising and increased tobacco consumption is tenuous at best." 2 Third, the opponents claim that voluntary
codes are the preferred and the more effective means of curbing tobacco
consumption."' Fourth, they assert that the ban amounts to protectionism in favor of EC tobacco monopolies and discriminates against foreign
competitors." 4 Fifth, they maintain that the Commission has underestimated the adverse economic consequences of a tobacco advertising ban on
the EC economy." 5 Sixth, the opponents insist that the Proposal is an
unwarranted attack on free speech principles." 6 Lastly, the opponents
are hostile to the Commission's increasing regulation because they fear
that the Commission will extend its regulatory reach to other internal
17
matters.
A.

The Legal Basis of the Proposal

In January 1992, Europe's tobacco lobby won a small victory in its
strategic battle against the tobacco advertising ban."" Relying on the
Parliament's legislative procedures, the opposing member states complained that Parliament's legal affairs committee had failed to issue its
requisite opinion either supporting or rejecting the legal basis of the Proposal." 9 Despite the fact that the legal affairs committee effectively had
approved the Proposal's legal basis when it had considered the Commis109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
See infra part III.A.
See infra part III.B.
See infra part III.0.

114.

See infra part III.D.

115. See infra part III.E.
116. See infra part III.F.
117.

See infra cart III.G.

118. Tobacco Lobby Scores Win in Delaying Advertising Ban, 1992-ExT.RNAL
IMPACT EUR. INTEGRATION, Jan. 24, 1992 [hereinafter Tobacco Lobby Scores].
119. Id.
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sion's original 1989 version of the ban, lobbyists succeeded in stalling the
Parliament for twenty-six days while the committee's opinion was
120
pending.
121
In February 1992, the legal affairs committee issued its opinion.
The committee agreed with the Commission that the Proposal was justified as a measure related to the establishment or furthermore of the internal market under article 100A of the Single European Act.1 22 Under
the auspices of article 100A, a proposal need garner only a simple majority in the Council of Ministers to be passed. 2
Although a moot point following the committee's finding, opposing
member states continue to challenge the questionable legal basis of the
Proposal.1 24 Opposing member states contend that the Proposal is not
tied to the establishment of a single market as article 100A requires. 2 5
They claim that the Commission has misused article 100A and that the
Proposal should fall under article 235, the "catch-all" category, requiring unanimity for all standard Commission proposals not vital to the
single market. 126 The opposing member states base their fierce criticism
of the Proposal's legal basis on the fact that under article 100A, as many
as four member states may be effectively silenced, regardless of how fervent their opposition to the ban may be.' 27 In essence, the opponents
attack the Commission for "us[ing] procedural measures to solve political
arguments."' 2 "
Moreover, opposing member states, especially the United Kingdom,
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See MATHIJSEN, supra note 1, at 13. Decisions under the Single European
Act's majority voting are made as each minister casts his member states' apportioned
number of votes. How EC Legislation is Decided, MARKETING, Sept. 15, 1991, at 3.
The Proposal will pass if 54 of the total 76 votes support the ban. Id. However, if 23
votes are cast in opposition to the ban, the Proposal will fail. Id.
124. See Tony Dawe, Art of Hitting the Political Target, THE TIMES (London),
Feb. 10, 1992, at 18; see also infra note 162 (discussing a lobbyist's two-tiered framework for challenging the Proposal).

125. See Health Council: Important Debate on the Ban on Tobacco Advertising,
EUR. REP., Nov. 9, 1991, at 16.

126. See David Buchan, Countdown to Maastricht: In Search of ClearerLegal Base
for EC Activities, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1991, at 3.
127. Johnson, supra note 10, at 9. In other words, if the vote had occurred and
Denmark, Greece, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom opposed the
ban, only two of these nations needed to have changed their position to have the ban pass
the majority requirement. See id.
128. Sarah Lambert, Ban on Cigarette Advertising Delayed By Firms, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 17, 1992, at 3.
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fear what they perceive as a trend away from the technical debate of
whether a proposal is 'single market enough' to become law on a majority decision, toward whether its general policy area has been recognized
by the Single European Act."29 Specifically, the United Kingdom fears
that by breaking up the new treaty into separate policy areas, the Commission will be free of having to justify its specific proposal as vital for
completion of the internal market. 130 The United Kingdom argues,
moreover, that because the Treaty does not treat industrial policy as a
distinct policy area within the Treaty, the tobacco advertising ban must
relate unequivocally to the internal market if it is to come under the less
rigorous majority standard.1 31
B.

Nexus Between Cigarette Advertising and Smoking Initiation and
Maintenance

1. Consumption Levels
Economic theory recognizes that there are two kinds of markets for
products.1 32 The first is characterized as immature. 3 In immature markets, total market size is volatile. Market size will tend to increase as
consumers become aware of the products, as the products become more
widely available, and as price of the product decreases due to technological advances. 34 In an immature market, product consumption is directly
proportional to the product's promotion in the marketplace. Economists
point to the home computer market as illustrative of an immature
35
market.1
In the second category, the market for products is characterized as
mature.' 3 6 In a mature market products are firmly established, widely
distributed, easily recognized by consumers, and available for a relatively
low price.13 7 In contrast to an immature market, the total market size in
a mature market remains relatively static.'
Advertising for mature
products, therefore, is directed at building brand loyalties and luring

129.
130.
131.
132.

Buchan, supra note 126, at 3.
Id.
See id.
T.C.H. King, Advertising Tobacco, THE TMEs (London), Feb. 21, 1992.

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136.

Id.

137, Id.
138. Id.
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consumers away from competing products."3 9
The tobacco companies of the opposing member states claim tobacco
falls into the mature market category. 4 0 The opposition argues that it is
much more profitable for a tobacco company to use advertising to insure
brand loyalty or to persuade people to change brands than it is to persuade consumers to initiate an activity they have never participated in. 4"
In support of this argument, the opposition points to a 1988 finding by
the Quebec Superior Court that found no significant connection between
tobacco advertising and tobacco consumption.14 2 In Imperial Tobacco
Ltd. v. Canada, the Canadian court struck down the Tobacco Product
Control Act, finding that the international data supporting the link be1 43
tween advertising and consumption to be no more than speculation.
139. Id.
140. See Philip T. Circus, Tobacco Advertising, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 16, 1992, at
22.
The plain fact is that there is no hard evidence of a link between tobacco advertising and total consumption. In a mature consumer market, such as that which exists for tobacco products, the role of advertising is in relation to brand competition.
To suggest otherwise is to imply that a great deal of money is being spent to no
effect, given the continuing fall in consumption.
Id.
141. Moreover, the opposing member states claim that not only does advertising not

initiate smoking, but neither does it encourage people to smoke more:
Does advertising encourage more people to buy cigarettes, or people to buy more
cigarettes? The answer in both cases is no. When manufacturers advertise soaps
do you wash more often? When oil companies advertise petrols do you increase
your car mileage? When catfoods are advertised do you rush out and buy a cat?
No. Despite the welter of new launches, competitions, giveaways, promotions, advertising campaigns and other hullabalo, total sales of newspapers have not increased for more than a decade.
William Fletcher, Ifs, Butts and Brussels, THE TIMES (London), Feb. 13, 1992, at A9.
142. See Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Canada, 55 D.L.R. 4th 555 (1988) (Que. Super.),
aj'd, 59 D.L.R. 4th 743 (1989) (Que. C.A.); see also Randal Marlin, A Judicious Use
of Words?, OTTAWA CITzEN, Aug. 12, 1991, at A7. Judge Chabot of the Quebec Superior Court found that the connection between tobacco advertising and increased consumption was "remote and unproven." Id. Judge Chabot explained that just because some
groups allege that there is a connection between tobacco advertising and consumption
does not necessarily make it so. Id.
143. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Canada, 55 D.L.R. 4th 555 (1988) (Que. Super.),
aff'd, 59 D.L.R. 4th 743 (1989) (Que. C.A.). Judge Chabot struck down the Tobacco
Product Control Act on numerous other grounds: (1) that the government exceeded its
authority in attempting to regulate advertising, an area which falls under provincial jurisdiction, (2) the law interfered unjustifiably with the tobacco industry's right to freedom
of expression under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and (3) the law denied consumers the right to choose for themselves. David Vienneau, Can Health Groups Send
Tobacco Ad Ruling Up In Smoke?, ToRoNTo STAR, Aug. 4, 1991, at B4.
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Moreover, the opposing member states, especially the United Kingdom, contend that there is no evidence that advertising bans have been
effective in those states that have instituted them.144 The opposition
points to China and the former Soviet Union as prime examples. Those
states had large smoking populations as well as the two largest tobacco
monopolies in the world, in spite of government prohibitions on tobacco
advertising. 4 5 In addition, Norway, Finland, and Portugal, all states
that have banned tobacco advertising for more than ten years, have together experienced the largest increases in smoking in Europe. 146
Furthermore, opponents claim a ban may cause a reversal of the
downward trend in tobacco consumption, similar to that which took
place with illegal drugs such as cocaine and marijuana, which thrive
without advertising.' 47 According to the opponents of the ban, the present amount of promotion for tobacco products arguably reduces their
subversive glamour and that a ban could actually have the effect of en48
hancing the appeal of tobacco products.'
2.

Smoking Among Children

The tobacco industry does not deny that children constitute a portion
of the European market for tobacco.' 4 9 The industry rejects the contenAlthough ruled unconstitutional, the Tobacco Product Control Act will remain in effect until all of the appeals are exhausted, a process that could take up to five years. Id.
Health organizations around the world have urged Canada to appeal the decision, believing that such a decision could have negative repercussions on worldwide efforts to reduce
tobacco consumption. See Canada to Appeal Against Ruling Overturning Tobacco Ad
Ban, REUTERS LIBR. REP., Aug. 14, 1991, at 11.
Many still support Canada's comprehensive tobacco strategy. See Garfield Mahood,

Clearing Away the Smoke, OTTAWA CrIZEN, Sept. 12, 1991, at A14. According to the
Canadian government, Canada's program against tobacco use has resulted in unprece-

dented declines in consumption. Id. Canadian tobacco consumption has declined approximately 25% since January 1989. Id. The government attributes its success to a combination of the tobacco advertising ban, stronger warnings, higher taxes, and restrictions on
smoking. Id.
144. See Fletcher, supra note 141, at A9.
145. Id.

146. Id.; see also Michael J. Waterson, Advertising and Tobacco Consumption: An
Analysis of the Two MajorAspects of the Debate, in THE IMPACT OF TOBACCO ADVERTISING 59, 66-72 (1990) (Special Report to the International Journal of Advertising).
147.

Fletcher, supra note 141, at A9.

148. Id.
149. See Simon Chapman, CigaretteAdvertising and Smoking: A Review of the Evidence, in SMOKING Our THE BARONS: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY 85 (British Medical Association ed., 1986). For example, in Britain in 1982,
children between the ages of 11 and 16 spent approximately £60 million on smoking. Id.
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tion, however, that advertising has a direct effect on a juvenile's decision
to begin smoking. 150 Rather, the industry asserts that any effects on children are indirect and minimal compared to other factors such as family,
peer pressure, and socioeconomic variables.15 ' The opposing member
states cite the British experience as supportive of their argument. That
is, although the British tobacco industry advertises extensively, spending
approximately £55 million each year, smoking among British juveniles
15 2
continues to decline among both females and males.
C.

Voluntary Codes Are More Effective

Opposing member states insist that the regulation of advertising is a
national matter'5 3 and therefore should be decided internally by each
state, free from Commission interference.'5 4 Moreover, they maintain
that each state's voluntary code of conduct for the tobacco industry is
more effective than the proposed blanket ban on advertising.' 55 The British claim they have had more success in reducing the number of tobacco-

150. The controversy over whether tobacco advertising has a direct effect on children
has made the Proposal one of the more emotional measures that the Commission has

introduced. EC ParliamentBacks Tobacco Advertising Ban, supra note 46. In a letter
to THE Trms, John Moxham, Chairman of Doctors for Tobacco Law, illustrates the
amount of emotion involved in the debate:
As [my patients] suffer their breathlessness and their cancers they recall how they
were recruited to their addiction when impressionable youngsters. These patients
have one wish: that their children and grandchildren are not also fooled by the
illusion of glamour fabricated by the tobacco industry and its supporters.
John Moxham, Tobacco Advertising, THE TIMES (London), Nov. 19, 1991, at A2.

151. See W. Fred van Raaij, The Effect of Marketing Communication on the Initiation ofJuvenile Smoking, in THE IMPACT OF TOBAcco ADVERTISING, supra note 146,
at 15. In his study, Professor van Raaij found that many different factors influence smoking initiation among adolescents. He categorizes the factors as either "distal" (meaning
characteristics such as personality and socio-economic standing, mass media information
such as advertising, and social norms about smoking, including smoking behavior of the
household members and peers) or "proximal" (pertaining to perception, evaluation, and

the decision processes of juveniles). Id. at 16. Relevant socio-economic traits are age,
gender, education, social class, and culture. Id. Relevant personality traits are maladaption, locus of control, lifestyle orientation, tolerance for deviance, health orientation, and
time preference. Id. at 17-18. As a means of illustration, van Raaij asserts that juveniles
of a lower social class are more susceptible to start smoking, due in substantial part to
their level of education. Id. at 17.
152. See Fletcher, supra note 141, at A9.
153. David Fletcher, Tobacco Advert Split Grows, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
Nov. 11, 1991, at 3.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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related deaths than have some states that have banned tobacco advertising. 156 Under the current voluntary code in the United Kingdom, tobacco
companies have agreed to refrain from advertising in cinemas and in
women's and youth-oriented magazines. 157 In addition, Ireland has
designed its own program, the Children and Young Persons (Protection
from Tobacco) Act, to ensure that tobacco is not easily accessible to children. 158 By the terms of the Act, the maximum penalty for selling tobacco to children under 16 is £2,500,159 and the sale of single or loose
cigarettes is forbidden. 60
D.

Protectionism

Relying on the statistics which indicate that advertising bans may have
no effect on tobacco consumption or may even increase it, the opposition
concludes that health is only a very small part of the impetus behind the
Proposal.' 61 Rather, the opposition maintains, the Proposal represents
one last desperate attempt by Europe's state monopolies to recover their
cigarette market share lost to Philip Morris. 6 2 Specifically, France, Italy, and Spain each have nationalized monopolistic tobacco industries
that they want to protect. 6 3 According to opponents of the ban, the tobacco monopolies have pushed through the tobacco advertising ban to

156. Wittstock, supra note 48, at A19.
157. Meade, supra note 11.
158. Lambert, supra note 128, at 3.

159. Id.
160. Id. Although the Act was due to become effective on January 1, 1992, local
authorities are postponing implementation because they realize that the Proposal, if
passed, may affect the Act's applicability. Id.
161. Andrew Leigh, Debate Over Protected Speech Heats Up in Advertising, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Nov. 20, 1991, at 10. Compare with the similar attack by an advertising association that if health were the real issue, one should ban tobacco, not the advertising for it. See Advertising a Bad Habit, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 17, 1992, at 20.
162. Bomb the Ban, FORBES, Feb. 17, 1992, at 54. The tobacco monopolies of
France, Italy, and Spain produce and market cigarettes. Revenues from the sale of their
tobacco flows directly into the hands of the government. Ten years ago, the tobacco monopolies had the domestic tobacco market substantially to themselves, however, the
United States tobacco industry led by Philip Morris has cut into their market share.
Since 1980, Philip Morris' sales have climbed to $3.3 billion in Europe, with a market
share of 33%. Marlboro, a brand manufactured by Philip Morris, has now become Europe's most popular cigarette brand. Id.
Leading lobbyist and European affairs director of the Advertising Association, Lionel
Stanbrook, believes that the most significant challenge to the proposed ban is the protectionism argument. However, as the debate intensifies, he plans to then raise objections
over the Proposal's legal basis. Dawe, supra note 124, at 18.
163. Free Speech Up in Smoke, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 13, 1992, at 18.
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reduce the visibility of Philip Morris cigarettes, in order to reduce the
consumer demand for them." The tobacco monopolies could then rely
on the price differential to regain that share of the market previously lost
to Philip Morris products, which typically sell for about twice the price
of local brands."6 The opponents of the ban argue that the Proposal, by
erecting protectionist trade barriers against multinational manufacturers,
will stifle competition" 6 and only make the tobacco industry more profitable.' 67 The opponents have labelled the Proposal a disguised blessing
168
for the industry which the ban set out to constrain.
E. Adverse Economic Consequences
Opposing member states oppose the Proposal because of its potential
economic impact upon the European Community. According to the opposition's figures, a total ban on tobacco advertising would mean a loss of
more than 150,000 jobs in the EC and cost newspapers and magazines
more than £60 million a year in revenues. 69 Although the Commission
estimated tobacco advertising throughout the European Community constitutes 1.6 percent of Europe's total advertising expenditures, the opposition claims that the correct figure is closer to 3 percent.' 70 There are
15,000 German jobs directly dependent upon tobacco advertising and another 100,000 German jobs that would suffer from a tobacco advertising
ban.1 1 Moreover, a ban on tobacco advertising would decrease the overall advertising revenue of magazines by 6.6 percent, and of newspapers
by 3.6 percent. 7 2 The Proposal could also endanger sports, arts, and
other events that rely on the sponsorship of tobacco companies.' 7 3 British
164.

Bomb the Ban, supra note 162.

165. Id.

166. Valerie Katham, EC Plan to Smoke Out the Truth About Tobacco Ad Effectiveness, MARKETING, May 23, 1991, at 8.
167. Fletcher, supra note 141.

168. Id. Moreover, opponents of the ban point to the irony of the Proposal given that

the European Community subsidizes the tobacco industry in Europe by $1.7 billion a
year, yet complains about high tobacco consumption. See Sport Cash Could Go Up in
Smoke, PRESS Ass'N NEWSFILE, Feb. 11, 1992, at 23; see also infra notes 194-99.
169. Jane Thynne, £60m A Year May Go Up in Smoke, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Jan. 18, 1992, at 6.
170.

Geoff Meade, Smoking Ads Ban Necessary to Cut Deaths, PRESS ASS'N NEW-

Jan. 16, 1992, at 16.
171. Id.
172. Thynne, supra note 169, at 6.

SFILE,

173.

Gary Mead, Tobacco Advertising May End in a Puff of Smoke, FIN.

TMES,

Nov. 26, 1991, at 112. Recently, the International Motor Sports Federation (FISA) announced that France's Grand Prix will be cancelled because of tobacco companies' with-
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sports, for example, could lose as much as £12 million in sponsorship
revenues as a result of a tobacco advertising ban. 1 4

F. UnreasonableRestriction on Free Speech
The opposing member states regard the tobacco advertising ban as an
attack on freedom of speech. The opposition maintains that advertise1 5
ments are a legitimate form of expression and deserve protection. 1
"Like all utterances with a purpose to persuade, advertisements are
sometimes untrue, but they are a legitimate form of expression which
helps consumers to find out what is an offer.117' Furthermore, the opposition points to the inconsistency of outlawing the promotion of a product
while still allowing for its sale.1 7 7 To the opposition, the question of
whether smoking is unhealthy is irrelevant. Rather, "[i]f smoking needs
to be defeated, it must be by free persuasion, not by suppression. 1 '78
G.

The Domino Effect

Opponents of the Proposal assert that a ban on tobacco advertising
would encourage the Commission to initiate a greater number of similar
or even more intrusive regulatory directives.1 79 Specifically, the opposition fears that the Proposal represents the beginning of excessive EC

drawal of funds as a result of France's domestic ban on tobacco advertising. Parliament
Starts Race Against Time to Save Grand Prix, AGENCY FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 18,
1992.

174. Wittstock, supra note 48.
175. Free Speech Up in Smoke, supra note 163, at 18. The opposition argues that
advertisements are a legitimate form of commercial expression because they aid consumers in learning about the type of products available for purchase. Id.

176, Id.
177. See Leigh, supra note 161, at 10. Both Germany and the Netherlands maintain
that the Proposal would subvert constitutional guarantees that all legal products may be
freely advertised. Brian Love, For Europe's Governments, Tobacco Ads Prove Addictive,
REUTERS Bus. REP., May 14, 1992.
178. Free Speech Up in Smoke, supra note 163, at 18. "If we believe that people are
grown up enough to decide on the merits of political parties after studying their propa-

ganda, we must also believe that they can do the same about industrial products." Id.
179. See Tobacco: European Parliament Pressesfor Total Ban on Advertising,
EUR. REP., Jan. 11, 1992, at 6. Ronald Beatson, director general of the European Association of Advertising Agencies, stated his concern about a domino effect if the Proposal
was enacted and that he and the other opponents were wary of "a whole mass of legislation coming out of the EC, aimed at barring all sorts of commercial speech." Charles
Goldsmith, Lobbyists in EC Battle Ban on Tobacco Ads, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 11,
1991.
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regulation and that advertising restrictions on alcohol, 8 0 toys, candy,
sports cars, and other products the Commission deems harmful are likely
to follow."8
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DEBATE

The debate over the proposed ban on tobacco advertising in the EC is
illuminated by a comparison to its parallel movement in the United
States in 1986 and 1987. The 1986 and 1987 bills requiring a ban on
the advertisement of tobacco products in the United States lend a helpful
perspective to the EC experience.
Although the 1986 bill died while still in committee, 82 a similar bill
introduced in 1987 existed long enough to create a stir in the United
States. 8 3 Entitled the Health Protection Act of 1987, the bill was clearly
the most pervasive attempt in a series of efforts to reduce United States
tobacco consumption and its accompanying health hazards. 84 Reasoning
that the advertising of tobacco products "deceptively portrays use of tobacco as socially acceptable and healthful [and] undermines the credibility of government and private health education campaigns against smoking,"' 8 5 the legislative committee recommended a complete ban on
tobacco advertising.' 86 In relevant part, the statute read, "No manufacturer, packer, distributor, importer, or seller of tobacco products in or
affecting commerce may engage in any consumer sales promotion of such
products."'1 8 7 The bill exempted tobacco retail outlets, however, providing

that they could display a type of tombstone advertisement stating that

tobacco products were available for sale on the premises.' 8
The Health Protection Act raised considerable controversy in the

180. According to several officials in the private television sector, the Commission
already has plans to ban alcohol advertising. The Commission, however, has refused to
confirm this allegation. See Tobacco: European ParliamentPressesfor Total Ban on
Advertising, supra note 180, at 7.
181. See Goldsmith, supra note 179.
182. H.R. 4972, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
183. See Kenneth L. Polin, Argument for the Ban of Tobacco Advertising: A First
Amendment Analysis, 17 HorsTRA L. REv. 99, 134 (1988).
184. Krista L. Edwards, Comment, FirstAmendment Values and the Constitutional
Protection of Tobacco Advertising, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 145 (1987).
185. H.R. 1272, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(14), (15), (23) (1987) (setting forth
proposed congressional findings).
186. Id. at § 3(a).
187. Id.
188. See Polin, supra note 183, at 134.
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United States. The American Bar Association,18 9 the American Civil
Liberties Union,190 and, not surprisingly, the American Advertising Federation condemned the bill. 9 In 1988, Congress voted against the
Act. 192 This defeat in the United States of the Health Protection Act of
1987 illustrates the international character of the tobacco advertising debate and the subtle workings of other variables such as nationalism, heritage, and history that can weigh heavily in a legislative forum.
A.

The Hypocrisy of the EC Proposal

According to the Commission, the proposed ban on tobacco advertising
is in accord with the European Community's overall agenda of decreasing tobacco consumption and its accompanying evils.' 93 Although the
proposed ban may be in tune with the rhetoric of the Commission, it is
not consistent with the EC's larger policy of maintaining tobacco subsidies and nationalized tobacco industries within Europe.
Specifically, the greatest irony of the Proposal is that the European
Community continues to pay the equivalent of more than $1.7 billion
each year in tobacco subsidies to tobacco farmers in the EC member
states.19 4 In the words of the opposition: "Several European countries
subsidise the growing of tobacco, and all garner huge amounts of tax
from it. But [the Commission is] attempting to put the entire burden on
the advertising-to shoot the messenger.' 95 Moreover, more than fifty
percent of the tobacco cultivated through subsidies from the EC is of
such low quality that it is deemed unsaleable.' 9 6 The unsaleable tobacco

must then be dumped at a loss in the world market. 197 While extolling

189. Gary A. Hengstler & Paul Marcotte, A.B.A. Rejects Tobacco Ad Ban, A.B.A.
J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 32; see also Polin, supra note 183, at 106 n.48 (listing reasons for
the American Bar Association's rejection of the tobacco advertising ban).
190. See Jean Cobb, Clearing the Air: Should All Cigarette Advertising and Promotion Be Banned?, COMMON CAUSE MAG., Mar./Apr. 1986, at 34, 37 (outlining some
of the representative opinions).
191. Id.
192. See Mark A. Stein, Reynolds Scion Taking Role in Prop. 99"s Anti-Tobacco
Drive, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1988, at A3.
193. See supra part III.C.
194. Anti-Smoking Campaigners Seek E.C. Tobacco Advertising Ban, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 24, 1992 [hereinafter Anti-Smoking Campaigners].See also Sport
Cash Could Go Up In Smoke, supra note 168, at 23. In contrast, the EC spent ony $14
million a year in its fight against cancer. Anti-Smoking Campaigners, supra.
195. Thynne, supra note 169, at 6 (statement of Sir Frank Rogers, chairman of the
European Publishers Council and deputy chairman of The Daily Telegraph).
196. Wittstock, supra note 48.
197. Free Speech Up in Smoke, supra note 164.
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publicly the virtues of its Europe Against Cancer campaign, the EC is,
in reality, merely exporting its cancer.'" 8
Similarly, the existence of tobacco subsidies in the United States was
clearly one of the many determinative factors in the failure of the Health
Protection Act.19 In the United States, the tobacco industry continues to
receive significant funding from the government each year.2 00 At present,
.the EC and the United States are both guilty of pursuing conflicting
governmental policies which aim to reduce tobacco consumption at the

same time they attempt to sustain or even increase tobacco production
levels. 20 1 Until they recognize and rectify this situation, any tobacco advertising ban is doomed to contradiction and ultimate defeat.

B.

The Free Speech Argument

In the United States, the notion of freedom of speech 20 2 played an
integral part in the downfall of the tobacco advertising ban. 2 3 Supporters of the United States ban maintained that smoking advertisements
198. See Thynne, supra note 47, at 4. A European official stated recently that the
Commission is considering a crop substitution scheme whereby European tobacco farmers would receive 20,000 ECU more in subsidies if they agree to grow less harmful
products. Tim Jackson, UK Fights Ban on Tobacco Advertising, INDEPENDENT, Nov.
13, 1992, at 14.
199. Janny Scott, Study Links Ads, Coverage of Smoking Hazards, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1992, at A27.
200. It is estimated that United States tobacco farmers receive approximately one
billion dollars per year in the form of federal subsidies. All Things Considered, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO, Oct. 22, 1992. The United States tobacco industry also enjoys a full tax
write-off for its advertising, costing the United States Treasury more than one billion
dollars per year. Louis J. Pauly & Louis Cohen, Reduce Tax Break to Tobacco Firms,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 20, 1992, at 2C.
201. See All Things Considered, supra note 200.
Well, they're taxing you and and me to pay the tobacco farmers a billion dollars a
year to grow tobacco, while at the same time they're taxing you and me millions of
dollars a year to pay the surgeon general's office to try to convince us not to use
this drug that they're taxing us a billion dollars a year to subsidize ... [that is]
insanity.

Id.
202. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the freedom of
speech. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
203. The American Bar Association refused to support the ban due mainly to the
Health Protection Act's conflict with the First Amendment. See Polin, supra note 183, at
106 n.48. It has been suggested, however, that the American Bar Association was not
really as concerned with freedom of speech as it was with avoiding lobbying expenses
they would incur if they agreed to support the bill. Id.
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which fraudulently depict healthy people involved in athletic activity 2200 45
or suggest to women that smoking is glamorous, sexy, or sophisticated
are deceptive advertising not worthy of First Amendment protection. 20 6
Opponents responded that they believed that the proponents contrived
the ban merely as a method of bypassing an unwillingness to ban tobacco
itself, and that such circumvention was clearly inconsistent with protected speech status afforded to commercial expression. 20 7 The controversy focused upon prior judicial decisions, with the debate centering
over whether the United States Supreme Court had in fact recognized
First Amendment protection for commercial speech.20 8
Specifically, until 1976,209 the Supreme Court had refused to extend
First Amendment protection to commercial speech .2 x0 As a result, in
1968, threatened with antismoking advertisements, the tobacco industry
agreed to refrain from advertising on television.2 11 By 1971, Congress
decided to formalize the agreement by passing legislation that banned
cigarette promotion on television.2 12 Although broadcasters lost substantial revenues as a result of the television ban, the United States courts
213
rejected all constitutional challenges to the ban.
Then in 1976, in the case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Supreme Court extended
free speech protection, albeit in a lesser degree, to commercial speech.2 14
As a direct result, the Court found various restrictions on the advertising
of legal services, utilities, contraceptives, and pharmacies to be unconsti-

204. Leigh, supra note 161, at 10.
205. See generally Celia Hall, Women's Magazines 'PromotingSmoking',
DENT, Jan. 10, 1992, at 2.
206. See generally Polio, supra note 183.
207. Id.
208. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.

INDEPEN-

209. Id.
210. Leigh, supra note 161, at 10.
211. Id. From its actions it is clear that the tobacco industry actually preferred a
complete ban of television advertising rather than sharing airtime with anti-smoking
commercials. Id.
212. Id. at 11.

213. Id.
214. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Specifically, the Court invalidated a Virginia statute making it unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to advertise the prices of prescription drugs. The Court based its decision on the grounds that society has an interest in the
free flow of commercial information and that a state cannot ban the dissemination of
truthful information. Id. Moreover, in the words of Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority: "[S]peech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent
to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another." Id. at 761.
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tutional.2 15 In the 1986 case of Posadas v. Tourism Co., however, the
Court retreated from its position of affording free speech protection to
advertisements and again upheld restrictions on advertising.21 6
As a result of the wavering interpretations by the United States Supreme Court, the commercial speech debate became one of semantics,
with each side attempting to undermine the other sides argument
through subjective analyses of the Court's decisions. In the EC, however,
the free speech issue has surfaced quite differently.
First and most notably, the Commission has avoided the legalistic dilemma of whether advertising constitutes a protected form of expression.
Rather, the Commission avoided this argument by asserting that while
advertisements may constitute protected speech, this protection is never
absolute.2" The Commission relied on article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights which states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression .... [T]he exercise of these freedoms, since it carries
with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection of health."2 8 Thus,
because the Commission considers public health protection to be the basis of the ban, the Proposal has constitutional value independent of any
alleged infringement on commercial expression.21 9 Whereas the United
States debate has focused on the hypertechnical legal analysis of freedom
of speech, the controversy in the EC is more effects-oriented and focuses
on the more practical considerations of whether the tobacco advertising
ban is a restriction necessary for the protection of health.

215.

Leigh, supra note 161, at 11.

216. 478 U.S. 328 (1986). The Posadas Court upheld a Puerto Rico statute and
regulations restricting advertising of casino gambling on the ground that the government's interest in decreasing demand for gambling to residents of Puerto Rico constituted
a substantial governmental interest that superceded any First Amendment commercial
speech challenge. Id.

217. See Why the Commission Proposes, supra note 9.
218. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953); Why the
Commission Proposes, supra note 9.
219. Why the Comission Proposes,supra note 9. The Commission relies in part on a
ruling adopted by the French Constitutional Council which specifically recognizes that
the public health concerns underlying a tobacco advertising ban constitutionally validate
such an action. Id.
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C. National Sovereignty
The federalist campaign of EC Commission President Jacques Delors
is struggling for survival. Although the Proposal boasts a seventy-four
percent public support rating, 22 0 several opposing member states, especially the United Kingdom, are uncertain how much sovereign power
they are willing to cede in the name of a "United States of Europe. "221
This uncertainty places the Proposal in a precarious position. The federalist campaign in Europe nonetheless has made advances. Most notably,
the Single European Act's qualified majority voting, which provides that
a reluctant member state may be vetoed, firmly implanted within the EC
the idea that the pursuit of political and economic union mandates some
sacrifice of sovereignty.2 22
The United Kingdom, however, remains influenced by the "Euroscare stories" about the implications of ceding too much authority to the

Commission. Stories abound about such things as the institution of compulsory square cheese and the demise of prawn cocktail crisps.22 3 Implicit in the British concern about EC-wide legislation is a perceived
need to ensure that the EC "does not become greater than the sum of its
224
parts.1
In contrast, the rejection of the United States tobacco advertising ban
involved its own unique set of variables. Specifically, in the United
States, the individual states rarely asserted that they, not the federal government had the power to regulate tobacco advertising. 226 The lack of
public support, not disputes regarding federalism, led to the bill's defeat. 226 At stake in the United States debate, therefore, were the prevailing policy arguments over the need and effectiveness of a ban and its
possible infringement on free speech principles. By contrast, at stake in

220. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
221. Geoff Meade, Sovereignty Question at the Heart of Euro-Unity, PRESS Ass'N
NEWSFILE, Dec. 4, 1991, at 16.
222. Id.
223. Id. Although appearing outlandish, the Commission has, for example, used its
power to harmonize condom sizes within the EC. Id.
224. Id.
225. Although the federal system recognizes that in many matters the states may be
able to deal more effectively in their own affairs without federal interference, Congress is
not significantly limited by federalism. See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:

A

PRIMER FOR THE PEOPLE

25-30 (1988) (discussing

the notion of federalism in the United States).
226. A Gallup poll taken in 1985 showed that only 32% of the United States public
favored a blanket ban on cigarette advertising. Smoking Guns: Philip Morris Seeking to
Turn Tide, Attacks Cigarettes' Opponents, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1986, at 1.
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the EC debate is the coveted concept of national sovereignty.
V.

CONCLUSION

The debate over the EC proposal to ban tobacco advertising centers on
the fight over the true function of,tobacco advertising and its effect on
society. Despite the opposition's clever reliance on the dichotomy between immature and mature markets, there can be no doubt that tobacco
advertising intends, to a substantial degree, to increase tobacco consumption,2 27 either by bringing new smokers into the market or by increasing
tobacco consumption among existing smokers. The existence of monopolistic tobacco industries that continue to advertise counters the opposition's assertions that advertising merely serves the function of informing
smokers about other brands.22 8
The opposition's argument that a ban would actually be beneficial for
the tobacco industries in Europe is also suspect. As commentators have
noted, "[i]f banning tobacco advertising is as good for the tobacco industry as [the industry] says . . . why isn't the industry advocating the

ban?1 229 In fact, the tobacco industry has run full-page ads condemning
230
the Proposal in approximately 100 newspapers and 200 magazines.
The cost of this advertising space has reached the equivalent of almost
$60 million.231 Moreover, "[t]he fact that tobacco companies spend so
much money on advertising shows that it does make a difference. ' 2 2
Perhaps the most notable aspect of the EC debate is its implications
for the internal market. One of the lessons of the controversy is that the
dismantling of internal trade barriers necessitates not only crucial logistical moves, but crucial psychological moves as well. In a poll which asked
business leaders of over 11,000 European firms to detail the worst barriers to trade,23 3 the most harmful barriers were administrative and customs paperwork, followed by frontier delays. The business community,
however, did not feel that subsidized markets are very important to the

227.

See Daniel H. Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff': Persuasion,Paternalism, and

Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1205, 1215 (1988).
228. See id. There are at least five states (Austria, Japan, South Korea, Thailand,
and Turkey) that have state tobacco monopolies, that is, no brand-switching opportunities, and yet still allow tobacco advertising. Id. at 1215-16.
229.

at B2.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Norman Harrison, Advertising Tobacco, THE TIMES (London), Feb. 20, 1992,

Goldsmith, supra note 179.
Id.
Should Tobacco Advertising Be Banned?, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 16, 1992, at 20.
See 1992; Border Wars, ECONOMIST, July 9, 1988, at 9.
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success of completing the internal market. Moreover, the business community often responds to efforts to eliminate invisible barriers with open
hostility and it is certain that without the business community's support,
achievement of a true internal market is unlikely. To achieve the single
market, the Commission must not waver in its efforts to eliminate invisible barriers to trade such as the varying tobacco advertising regulations
among the EC member states.
In addition, national sovereignty plays a role in the opposition to the
tobacco advertising proposal. President de Gaulle's statement in 1965
serves well to describe the prevailing attitude in the EC states: "However big the glass which is proffered from the outside, we prefer to drink
from our own glass, while at the same time clinking glasses with those

around us."'2 34 It seems that most of the EC member states like the idea
of a single market and agree to most of the same free market standards.
Yet they are not so sure that they should cede any more of their national
sovereignty. They would prefer, that is, to drink from their own glass.
Moreover, the "United States of Europe" notion the Commission
promised must seem almost absurd to those million or so Europeans who
can still recall the deep hatred, divisions, and destruction of World War
II. Clearly, another factor delaying the successful completion of the internal market is the language barrier that is exemplified by the fact that
many Europeans require a bilingual dictionary merely to exchange
greetings.
The European Community still lacks a central organ of government
comparable to the powerful federal government in the United States, and
member states remain wary of delegating their authority to the various
existing EC organs. Furthermore, the Commission, in proposing the tobacco advertising ban, is entering into an area with a long history and
solid tradition. Europeans discovered tobacco during Columbus' historic
voyage in 1492,235 and from that moment tobacco has been firmly implanted in European society. The tobacco industries have armed themselves with enough economic influence and political clout to sway legislative acts in their favor. Nevertheless, EC Commissioners are confident
that they will pass the Proposal within the next several years. Surely,
regardless of whether the member states ultimately reject the ban, the
vote in the EC Parliament supporting the Proposal represents a significant step toward harmonizing the varying tobacco advertising regulations
in the EC. In the words of one of the supporters of the ban: "The vote in

234. Id.
235.
RIES

JEROME E. BROoKs, THE MIGHTY LEAF: TOBACCO THROUGH THE CENTU-

11-12 (1952).
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the European Parliament is yet another nail in the coffin of tobacco
advertising.""26'
Jennifer A. Lesny

236. Wittstock, supra note 48. In addition, Vasso Papandreou was quoted as saying:
"It's a question of time. If it's not this year or the next, it may well be the year after."
Love, supra note 178.

